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Socio-legal studies in France: beyond the Law Faculty  
Introduction 
Setting out to explain the presence - or in this case the relative 
absence – of the ‘socio-legal’ in a particular jurisdiction requires 
some attempt to set out an understanding of what remains a 
notoriously malleable concept. This is all the more important given 
that one striking difference between France and the United Kingdom 
is the very absence of a body of knowledge explicitly conceptualized 
and characterised in terms of the label ‘socio-legal.’ Furthermore, in 
Anglo-American scholarship, there are not only diverse ways of 
characterising the ‘socio-legal’ but there are tensions and even 
contradictions at the heart of the concept which flow in part from 
different ways of viewing its relationship to more traditional forms 
of legal scholarship. 1 The ‘socio-legal’ can be seen as a supplement 
or even complement to the doctrinal analysis of primary legal 
sources that is made desirable - or indeed even necessary - by the 
need to maintain law as a functioning social institution (law in 
action) as opposed to pure text (law in books).  Effective decisions 
about legal reform may be seen to require some analysis of the 
practical effects of law on society or parts of society and some 
analysis of the social interests and claims in play. This is the kind of 
socio-legal work sometimes associated with the term ‘law in 
context’ and with the kind of policy-oriented research based on 
empirical social science that is often fostered and financed by 
Governments. But the rise of the ‘socio-legal’ since the 1960s has 
also been associated with various explicit and radical challenges to 
law as a social institution in general and doctrinal analysis as a 
disciplinary practice in particular. The influence of feminism, 
Marxism and other forms of critical legal scholarship has been 
profoundly felt in direct, frontal critique of traditional assumptions 
about the autonomy of law and legal analysis. Indeed, some legal 
scholars from these critical currents might eschew the label ‘socio-
legal’ exactly because of its association with more reformist 
ambitions: they do not want to see themselves as repointing the 
legal brickwork when the aim should be to tear the house down. 
These different and contested ways of understanding the ‘socio-
legal’ as either supplement or challenge to law as a discipline, are 
                                                             
1 The literature on the nature of the ‘socio-legal’ is too extensive even to cite 
conveniently here. But some references can be found in previous reviews in this 
series in the Journal of Law and Society. Both articles adopted – as we do here - 
very broad church definitions of the concept: K Economides  ‘Socio-legal studies 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand (2014) 41 J. Law and Society 257, H Arthurs and A 
Bunting ‘Socio-legal Scholarship in Canada: A Review of the Field’ (2014) 41 J. 
Law and Society 487 
reflected in different relationships between law and other 
disciplines. Sometimes, work drawing on other disciplines may 
complement and sustain the dominant paradigm (for example, 
certain kinds of philosophy of law or legal history). But insights 
drawn from sociology and other disciplines (including certain 
strands of philosophy and legal history) have also been key parts of 
the critique of traditional conceptions of the autonomy of law as a 
discipline and of the legitimacy of law as a social institution 
purporting to depersonalise the exercise of power. This critical 
edge, drawing on a range of disciplines, while by no means a 
dominant force in socio-legal studies, has been a key element of an 
increasingly pluralist approach to legal scholarship in Anglo-
American societies. What we want to do in this analysis of the 
‘socio-legal’ in France is not to try to determine and apply a 
particular ‘correct’ interpretation of the term but to chart the 
presence and absence of these related yet distinguishable views as 
to how to study and teach law in the debates and practices in the 
French academy. We will argue in Part I that it is the disturbance in 
Anglo-American Law Schools of the traditional paradigm of law and 
legal analysis that is one key point of contrast with France where 
that paradigm has continued to dominate scholarship in the Law 
Faculties. The untidy and unruly co-existence of very different 
strands to socio-legal studies in the UK has been accompanied by 
the sense (amongst supporters and detractors alike) that it has 
gained an important foothold inside the Law Faculty and shaped the 
scholarly identity of many legal academics and researchers.2 In 
contrast, French Law Faculties are marked by greater disciplinary 
orthodoxy characterised by a highly and distinctively structured 
form of doctrinal analysis and relative closure to the external 
critique of law. Our initial story is about how those key features 
were historically constituted and have been institutionally and 
discursively maintained, in part because the centralized formation of 
disciplines and sub-disciplines in France shapes institutional 
development and scholarly identity in a way that it does not in the 
UK. Accordingly, in Part I, we set out the way in which the historical 
construction of legal science in France and its relations with the 
broader social sciences have entrenched a particular paradigm of 
legal scholarship which has prevented the effective construction of 
alternative ‘socio-legal’ conceptions of the discipline. But in Part II, 
                                                             
2 The strength of that foothold is a matter of some debate. Witness the question 
in R Collier’s  ‘We’re all socio-legal now? Legal education, scholarship and the 
Global Economy – Reflections on the UK experience’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law 
Review 503 and see generally F Cownie Legal academics: culture and identities 
(2004). 
we outline the presence of various fragments of the socio-legal in 
France to be found sometimes inside but more often outside the 
Law Faculties.  
I. EXPLAINING ABSENCE  
Law Faculties in France remain dominated by doctrinal analysis. 
Socio-legal research, in any of the diverse forms outlined above, 
remains atypical of their intellectual production and continues to be 
treated as heterodox by the socialising institutions of the legal 
academy. This relative absence is the product of the distinctive 
history of legal thought in France and of the particular development 
of its universities as institutions. So we will explore first the 
foundation of law as a scientific discipline, as a distinct legal science 
(A) and secondly the development in France of a central state 
framework guaranteeing the institutional reproduction of disciplines 
within the university system (B).  
 
A. Genealogy of French Legal science  
French political history has been marked by ruptures which have 
often had considerable effects on domestic law: the 19th century 
codifications following the Revolution are a prime example. In 
contrast the history of legal science in France is one of remarkable 
continuity. The academic practices of jurists have their roots in a 
tradition that stretches back beyond the Revolution (1). Scholarly 
discourse in law has been clearly distinct from that of the social 
sciences and although there have been significant moments of 
dialogue between the two, these have proven to be interludes 
rather than an enduring process of exchange (2).  
 
1. Before the Revolution: tracing the origins of the French 
civil law tradition   
The self-identity of French legal scholars is as inheritors of a long 
and noble academic tradition. Despite many changes over the 
centuries in the way in which legal scholarship is conducted, it is 
still not uncommon to evoke explicitly the long lines of this 
collective intellectual inheritance.3 The nature of these genealogical 
claims reveals much about the way the discipline is defined by 
French legal scholars themselves: looking for ancestors, they are 
more likely to choose  the medieval jurisconsults than the 20th 
century founders of social science. Because legal scholarship is seen 
                                                             
3 F. Audren and J.-L. Halpérin, La culture juridique française. Entre mythes et 
réalités (XIXe–XXe siècles) (2013) 11, P. Jestaz and C. Jamin, La doctrine (2004).  
as a key element in the construction of the civil law tradition 
generally, this emphasis on continuity is a source of prestige.4 The 
link in France is particularly strong because  the drafters of the 
iconic Civil Code of 1804 are widely seen as having  drawn many of 
their key organising concepts from the synthesizing Treatises of the 
jurisconsults of the 17th and 18th centuries.5 The line of filiation back 
to medieval predecessors continues to be emphasized by modern 
French scholars as a means of reinforcing their claim to be the 
primary authorised interpreters of legal texts and guardians of their 
legitimacy.6 Here the history marks a difference between the 
romano-germanic tradition and that of the common law, where it is 
the judge who is more frequently accorded the primary role in legal 
interpretation and guardianship.  
This historically constituted notion of scholars as guardians of the 
legal tradition is linked to a particular interpretive role which reflects 
a dominant paradigm in the way legal knowledge should be 
structured and set out.7 Domat’s Loix civiles8 provided a classic 17th 
century model for the writing of text books and treatises that was 
passed from generation to generation. First in the richly detailed 
19th century commentaries on the Code Civil but later in 
independent works of exposition, analysis is typically built around a 
series of conceptual binary oppositions (such as law/rule, positive 
law/natural law, law/equity, public law/private law). These 
bifurcations provide a structured intellectual framework within 
which legislative texts are understood, explained and interpreted.9 
During the 19th century this model was used to set out a 
comprehensive theory defining persons and their substantive rights: 
what it did not do was to describe the practice of civil law and 
certainly not the process of enforcing those rights. This emphasis on 
systematic doctrinal exposition, rooted in a concern to promote 
abstract conceptual coherence and unity, still organises the modern 
textbook which introduces students to law and its various branches 
in France.10 Indeed, the abundant and tangled growth that is 
                                                             
4 R. David and C. Jauffret-Spinosi, Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains 
(2002, 11th ed.) at 117, J.-L. Thireau, ‘La doctrine civiliste avant le Code civil’ in 
La doctrine juridique, eds. Y. Poirmeur et al. (1993), 13.  
5 A.-J. Arnaud, Les origines doctrinales du Code civil (1969). On French legal 
doctrine prior to the Revolution see A. Wijffels, Introduction historique au droit. 
France, Allemagne, Angleterre (2010), 214-225. 
6 For a general examination of ways in which Law Professors have emphasized 
their status as privileged interpreters of legal texts, see J. Chevallier, ‘Les 
interprètes du droit’, in Y. Poirmeur et al., op. cit. (La doctrine juridique), 259.  
7Arnaud (A.-J.), ‘La tradition française dans la théorie du droit des civilistes’, (1988) 
33 Archives de philosophie du droit 261. 
8 Id., esp. 262-264.  
9 Id. 
10 On the history of legal textbooks in France, see A.-S. Chambost (ed.), Histoire 
des manuels de droit. Une histoire de la littérature juridique comme forme du 
discours universitaire (2014). 
modern case-law in France is seen to combine with the 
multiplication of legislative texts to call even more clearly for a 
structuring and ordering of - and thus an abstraction from - the 
increasingly detailed rules of positive law. This is seen to require 
elaborate organisation through the identification of distinct branches 
of law as well as the search for, and exposition of, general principles 
which explain and render coherent and consistent existing legal 
rules (and thus also offer a guide to future solutions).11  
The perceived importance within legal science of the search for 
intellectual coherence through systematisation and structure has 
been reflected in the development and institutionalization of a highly 
particular and elaborately structured way of presenting academic 
legal writing. This requires not only that argument be structured in 
two parts with two sub-parts (often with the sub-parts being divided 
into two sub-sub parts) but also be accompanied by compliance with 
elaborate requirements as to the structure of the introduction, the 
form of headings and sub-headings and transitional phrases from one 
part to another. The effect is to require an explicit focus throughout 
on the interrelations between the elements of the whole argument. 
Since the mid 20th century, this has become an orthodoxy of structure 
rigorously enforced by teachers on students from the first year of 
legal study at university and is a requirement of published academic 
articles, presentations and even examinations.12 Because le plan 
binaire is an intellectual practice particular to the Law Faculties, it 
reinforces the disciplinary autonomy of legal science. 
Distinct both from the philosophy of law and the social sciences, this 
notion of a ‘fundamental legal science’13 thus has as its specific 
purpose the systematization of norms. In its search for internal 
coherence within the body of positive rules, legal scholarship can be 
seen as reinforcing the ideological legitimacy of the legal order in its 
claims to the apparent depersonalisation of the exercise of power. A 
key critical strand within socio-legal studies within the Anglo-
American common law world since the 1960s has been to point out 
and expose the contradictions in this role of legal scholar as 
ideological guardian.14 But within the romano-germanic tradition, 
                                                             
11 Jamin, Jestaz, op. cit., at 231. 
12 M. Lemieux, ‘La récente popularité du plan en deux parties’, Revue de 
recherche juridique. Droit prospectif (1987-3) 823, M. Vivant, ‘Le plan en deux 
parties, ou de l’arpentage considéré comme un art’, Études offertes à Pierre 
Catala. Le droit privé français à la fin du XXème siècle (2001), 969. To illustrate 
the operation of the structured approach we have chosen to draft this article 
more or less in accordance with its dictates.  
13 C. Atias, Epistémologie juridique (1985), at 58. 
14 In the United States, this kind of critique is associated with critical legal studies 
and work of the likes of Duncan Kennedy and Mark Kelman. For a particular 
application to criminal law in the United Kingdom see A. Norrie, Crime Reason 
and History, (2014, ch. 1), Third edn for his deconstruction of the assumptions 
the centrality of that role can be traced back to its origins and in 
France it has been subject to much less contestation within the Law 
Faculty.15 This view of legal scholarship sets it apart from some of 
the broader questioning characteristic of the social sciences.  There 
have been moments in which opportunities have developed for 
exchange and synthesis between law as a discipline and those other 
social sciences. But these moments of dialogues have not led to a 
major challenge to the dominant place of the doctrinal conception of 
legal science.  
 2. Historical interludes: brief and interrupted dialogues 
between legal doctrine and social science 
A hundred years after the promulgation of the Code civil, there was 
a moment when a new generation of legal scholars sought to 
challenge established practice and to break with the dominant 
academic tradition by claiming allegiance to a ‘scientific’ approach.16 
Around the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, they argued for a 
theoretical revolution that would refine and reform the methods of 
legal analysis.17 Aging codes, dynamic growth in case-law, the 
development of the social sciences and finally the need to counter 
‘legal socialism’ were all said to call for this renewal of legal 
scholarship.18 The argument was informed by a sharp critique of 
traditional practices, most notably François Gény’s19 assessment of 
19th century legal literature as dominated by the blind cult of 
legislative codes and the false pretensions of abstract logic.20 A 
remaking of legal scholarship was advocated that would go beyond 
a mere exposition of the Codes to draw on legal history,21 on 
                                                             
underpinning classical liberal legal scholarship (citing Williams, Smith and Hogan 
and MacCormick). 
15 See however the work of P. Legendre which has been dedicated to revealing 
the role played by legal scholars in legitimating the established order from the 
medieval period onwards starting with L’amour du censeur (1974). 
16 A.-J. Arnaud, Les juristes face à la société du XIXe siècle à nos jours (1975), 75-
124. 
17 C. Atias, ‘Philosophie du droit : les enjeux d'une fin de siècle’, in L'évolution de 
la philosophie du droit en Allemagne et en France depuis la fin de la seconde guerre 
mondiale, eds. G. Planty-Bonjour, R. Legeais (1991), esp. 241-251, C. Jamin, 
‘Relire Labbé et ses lecteurs’ (1992)37 Archives de philosophie du droit, 248. 
18 R. Saleilles, ‘Introduction’ in Collège libre de sciences sociales, Les méthodes 
juridiques (1911), at xxiii. 
19 F. Gény, Méthode d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif, (1919, Tome 
1), 17-204 (first published in 1899). On Gény’s work, see C. Thomasset et al. , 
François Gény. Mythes et réalités. 1899-1999, centenaire de Méthode 
d'interprétation et sources en droit privé positif (2000), B. Oppetit (B.), Droit et 
modernité (1998), 231-254. 
20 F. Gény, op. cit., at 124. 
21 J. Gaudemet, ‘Les écoles historiques du droit en France et en Allemagne au XIXe 
siècle’, (1998)19 Revue d'histoire des facultés de droit et de la science juridique 
87, A. Dauteribes, ‘Laboulaye et la réforme des études de droit’ (1990) 10/11  
Revue d'histoire des Facultés de droit et de la science juridique 13. 
experimental sciences and on comparative law. Raymond Saleilles 
argued that an historical approach represented the adoption of a 
scientific method because history sort to free itself of the subjective 
by holding to the facts.22 It was thus the ideal means for analysing 
the life of the law as existing legislative texts were adapted to new 
social needs.23 Other legal scholars evoked the experimental 
sciences and the philosophy of Auguste Comte: they argued the 
need to go beyond a metaphysical approach to one that saw law as 
just another observable social reality.24 For example, some legal 
scholars used analogies drawn from biological explanations of 
organic life to explain legal transformations.25 The third and final 
strand in this attempt to renew legal scholarship was founded on 
the comparative. The key stimulus was the first International 
Congress of Comparative Law which took place in Paris during the 
Universal Exhibition in 1900. The argument was that the 
comparative method would enable scholars to guide legislators and 
judges: doctrinal analysis of foreign laws would enable the 
identification of an ‘international legal consciousness’ consisting of 
universal principles that could be used to inform the development of 
national law. 26 
These arguments for an opening out of legal thought were 
reinforced by the development of the nascent discipline of sociology 
within Humanities Faculties. Durkheim was the key figure in both 
establishing an intellectual framework for sociology of law and 
defining its major tasks. L’Année sociologique, the periodical that he 
founded in 1896, became a site of rich dialogue between law and 
sociology. As a result, some renowned Professors within the Law 
Faculties began to draw inspiration from sociology in their legal 
research and teaching. Perhaps most famously, Léon Duguit explicitly 
used Durkheim’s concepts in his work on public law, rejecting all that 
was ‘metaphysical’ in order to found legal analysis on the ‘real facts’ 
of social interdependence.  He was not alone: certain other legal 
                                                             
22 R. Saleilles, ‘Le Code civil et la méthode historique’, in Le Code civil (1804-1904), 
Livre du centenaire (1904, Tome 1), 99. On Saleilles, see. R. Beudant et al., 
L'œuvre juridique de Raymond Saleilles (1914). More recently, see F. Tellier, ‘Le 
droit à l'épreuve de la société. Raymond Saleilles et l'idée du droit social’ (1999) 
20 Revue d'histoire des facultés de droit et de la science juridique 147. 
23 R. Saleilles, ‘École historique et droit naturel’ (1902)1 Revue trimestrielle de droit 
civil at 97. 
24 C. Jamin, ‘L'oubli et la science. Regard partiel sur l'évolution de la doctrine 
privatiste à la charnière des XIXe et XXe siècles’ (1994)93 Revue trimestrielle de 
droit civi 815. 
25 For an application of the evolutionary theories of Hebert Spencer to law, see R. 
Fremont, ‘De la formation des notions juridiques et du rôle de la jurisprudence dans 
les institutions’, Pandectes françaises (1886, Tome 1), at vi. 
26 K. Zweigert, H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, Transl. by T. Weir 
(1998, 3rd edn), 2. See also R. Munday, ‘Accounting for an Encounter’, in 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions, eds P. Legrand and R. 
Munday (2003) 3-8. 
scholars of the early 20th century began to examine legal 
transformations from a sociological perspective.27 
But the important point for our story is that this moment of 
interdisciplinary dialogue did not provide the foundation for the 
development of a socio-legal current within the Law Faculties. The 
advocates of an opening up to sociology remained marginal. From 
now on there was an interest from legal scholars in social questions 
but the disciplinary separation of Law and Humanities Faculties 
remained strong and legal scholars retained their monopoly over law 
as an object of inquiry by reaffirming the specificity and 
distinctiveness of legal science. In the end, the vast majority of Law 
professors never attempted the descriptive sociology of law 
associated with Durkheim.28 They were content simply to expand the 
range of legal sources studied beyond legislative codes to include 
case-law. Increasingly, from the start of the 20th century, 
jurisprudence was seen as providing a privileged point of observation 
for social reality, as the ‘law in action.’29 This enabled legal scholars 
to deepen their accounts of the relations between law and society 
while retaining for legal science an object of inquiry that was distinct 
from that of the other social sciences.30 Thus any opening up to 
‘scientific’ influences that took place was not accompanied by a shift 
from the traditional conception of the mission of legal science, that is 
to say to develop coherence and consistency of legal norms by 
systematic exposition.31 From then on, one can trace more frequent 
references to history, social sciences or to comparative law.  These 
new ‘scientific’ elements involved the observation of social facts but 
their significance and meaning continued to be defined by a 
normative conception of legal scholarship that was based on giving 
structure and coherence to a body of positive legal rules rather than 
to defining the social causes of those rules or explaining the 
complexity of their actual social functioning.32  
There are many reasons for the persistence of this traditional 
approach in French legal scholarship: one of the most central is the 
institutional framework within which the legal discipline operates in 
French universities.  
                                                             
27 See for example J. Cruet, La vie du droit et l’impuissance des lois (1908). 
28 F. Soubiran-Paillet, ‘Histoire du droit et sociologie : interrogations sur un vide 
disciplinaire’, (1997) 29 Genèses : Sciences sociales et histoire, 156-159. 
29 E. Serverin, Sociologie du droit (2000), 21-24. 
30 P. Lascoumes, ‘Le droit comme science sociale. La place de Durkheim dans les 
débats entre juristes et sociologues à la charnière des deux derniers siècles (1870-
1914)’, in Normes juridiques et régulation sociale, eds. F. Chazel et J. Commaille 
(1991), esp. at 46. 
31 Arnaud (1975), op. cit., esp. 122-125.  
32 Jamin, Jestaz, op. cit., at. 146. 
B. Disciplinary frameworks and the maintenance of 
scholarly orthodoxy 
The distinctive political and institutional history of the university 
system in France has had an important impact in maintaining 
disciplinary orthodoxy in French legal science. Both its doctrinal 
focus and its relative closure to external influence can be explained 
in part by French traditions in the organizing of academic disciplines 
(1), and in part by very particular ways of recruiting academic staff 
(2). Both have made it more difficult to break with traditional 
disciplinary orthodoxies.  
  1. French Faculties and the discipline of disciplines  
The very structure of French higher education provides a key to 
understanding the capacity of disciplines to resist disruptive 
external challenges. The tabula rasa of the 1789 revolution led to a 
complete reconstruction of the university system. What emerged 
under the Empire was a classic example of statist and centralizing 
Napoleonic reform.33 Distinct both from the German model with its 
vaunting of academic freedom and the English tradition of 
universities with strong institutional autonomy,34 the effect of the 
reorganization of the French university system was to make both 
Faculties and academics much more clearly dependent than 
elsewhere on the political will of the central state.35 Curricula were 
defined nationally and identical rules for examination procedures 
and the content of teaching were applied to the whole nation. The 
structure of the new university was standardized by national 
regulations which divided France into distinct geographic units for 
administrative purposes (académies). Faculties of theology, 
medicine, law, sciences and humanities were established in each 
académie according to an identical model. Each faculty was 
independent from the others but subject to the control of the 
central state in the allocation of funding, the definition of curricula 
and the conferring of academic status. The state appointed leading 
academic figures to a national Conseil de l’Instruction Publique to 
manage the particular discipline they represented.36 There was no 
attempt at coordination between faculties: each was free to develop 
its own standards of regulation thus reinforcing disciplinary 
compartmentalization.37  
                                                             
33 C. Musselin, The Long March of French Universities (2004), at 11. 
34 C. Charle, J. Verger, Histoire des universités, (1994), 63-75. 
35 C. Granger, La destruction de l'université française (2015), at 20. 
36 C. Musselin, op. cit., at 12. 
37 C. Charle, La République des universitaires (1994) 135. 
The Faculties of Law themselves were conceived and established by 
Napoleon as being guarantors of the legal culture of the central 
state and guardians of the established legal order.38 In general, in 
the 19th century the French government relied on the universities to 
reinforce the legitimacy of its authority and maintain social 
cohesion.39 If the lycée was seen as the primary instrument of 
social integration at the level of secondary school, the Law Faculties 
were seen as serving a similar purpose at university level.40 By 
monopolizing legal education, the central state could determine 
competence in law. And by determining the content and methods of 
the teaching of law it could ensure the social acceptance of the new 
Codes. The Law Faculties’ role in confirming the legitimacy of the 
19th century social order was reflected in the growing social 
prestige of Law Professors and a certain deference on their part viz 
a viz political power.41 The establishment of the Republic in 1870 
and the reinforcement of academic freedom that accompanied it did 
not fundamentally alter the idea that the universities’ principal role 
was to support a central state whose mission was the governance of 
the collective and the framing of its future.42  
The institutionalized subordination of the mission of the University 
to that of the central state tended to favour the orthodoxy of 
traditional legal science rather than its critical challenge. From their 
promulgation in the early years of the century, legal education 
became centred on the textual study of the Napoleonic codes, 
privileging distinctive techniques of legal reasoning and the 
objective of training future legal practitioners. Attempts in 1819 to 
broaden the subjects studied to include natural law, history of the 
philosophy of law and administrative law foundered on opposition 
from within the discipline. It was only in 1889 that Government 
regulations introduced political economy, general history of law and 
elements of constitutional law into the law curriculum.43 Slowly over 
the 20th century, elements of general culture were introduced in 
the form of courses on history, political science and economics.  But 
this did not represent a challenge to doctrinal analysis as the central 
                                                             
38 Audren, Halpérin, op. cit., chap. 1. 
39 Granger, op. cit., 22-23. 
40 The Ministry of Justice declared in 1801 that the Law Schools were seen as 
building a second level of education onto that of the lycées’, ‘Un rapport du 
ministre de la justice sur les écoles de droit en 1801’ (1988) 7 Revue d'histoire 
des facultés de droit et de la science juridique 164. 
41 Audren, Halpérin, op. cit. at 35. See also P. Bonin, ‘Education juridique et 
politique sentimentale. L’Ecole de droit de Paris et les journées de 1848’, in P. 
Gonod et al., L’Ecole de droit de la Sorbonne dans la cité (2012), 61-67.  
42 C. Granger, op. cit., 34-35. 
43 Audren, Halpérin, op. cit., 119. 
core of the discipline of law: rather it was thought that some kind of 
familiarity with social sciences would help to produce more 
intellectually cultivated lawyers.44 This idea that Law Faculties 
fulfilled a social as well as intellectual function can be traced back to 
the Revolution: legal studies had long been seen as not just 
valuable for those engaged in the conduct of public affairs and 
business but as transmitting a certain common culture essential to 
notable public figures.45 
Given the disciplinary conservatism of Law Faculties and limited 
acceptance of social sciences into the curriculum, it is perhaps not 
surprising that when the new sciences of government emerged they 
did so outside the academy. In the 19th century, a number of 
institutions emerged aimed at the production of practical knowledge 
with potential application to the problems of government. But they 
did so at the interface between the world of the universities and 
that of state bureaucracy rather than within the Law Faculties.46 
Even today not only most senior French civil servants but also its 
administrative judges are trained in matters of law and government 
in these institutions. This has developed into a very particular 
French division in the training of elites as between Universities and 
les grandes écoles.47 The latter are the most prestigious institutions 
of post-school education in France but are not Universities. Their 
status is linked not only to superior resourcing but also to powers of 
selection at entry in relation to students. University Faculties, 
including Law Faculties, must accept all local students who have 
passed the Baccalaureat whereas the fierce elitism of les grandes 
ecoles is entrenched by concours d’entree and numerus clausus.48 
What this means is that the most gifted students interested in the 
study of relations between law, politics and government tend to 
gravitate not towards University Law Schools but towards national 
institutions whose alumni constitute a Republican technocratic elite 
and a formidable network of political influence. Faced by the 
challenge of these prestigious rival institutions camped in this key 
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interdisciplinary space, it is not surprising perhaps that Professors 
of Law have continued to emphasize their distinctive lawyerly skills 
in doctrinal analysis. Furthermore, the system of recruitment of Law 
Professors reinforces the weight placed on specialist technical 
lawyerly skills rather than interdisciplinary innovation.  
2. Recruiting the discipline: the moulding of French legal 
scholars  
Although there have been many legislative reforms to university 
governance in France, the structure of university disciplines remains 
fundamentally as established in the 19th century.49 Key to this is the 
continued existence of a central authority in the form of the Conseil 
National des Universités (CNU) which controls and manages the 
progression of scholarly careers within the French academy. This is a 
national council made up of 52 sections, each corresponding to a 
discipline, staffed by tenured academics who are partly elected by 
their peers and partly appointed by the Ministry of National 
Education, Higher Education and Research.50 The CNU determines 
centrally whether candidates are academically qualified to apply to 
become maître de conférences (tenured lecturer) or to be promoted 
to professor. Universities make local hiring and promotion decisions 
but only on the basis of these nationally established lists of qualified 
candidates within each discipline. There are three sections relating to 
law: private law (section 01), public law (02) and legal history (03). 
All the other academic disciplines that provide an external 
perspective on law also have their own sections (for example political 
science (04), economics (05) and sociology and demography (19)). 
But critically, there has never been a section for socio-legal studies. 
This means that work that might be defined in such terms is 
separated out and divided up into adjunct sub-disciplines of existing 
sections which thus remain marginal to those sections and disciplines 
(examples would be criminal sociology, law and economics or legal 
linguistics). As each of the sections develops its own set of criteria 
for disciplinary excellence and acts as “gate-keeper” to academic 
recognition,51 those who aspire to be socio-legal researchers must 
nevertheless create for themselves an academic identity that is 
recognizable to the guardians of disciplinary standards. A researcher 
with a socio-legal profile, however excellent, may find it difficult to 
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be recognized as suitably qualified by any of the CNU sections:52 his 
or her work may be seen as marginal to the relevant discipline, either 
too legal for the social scientist or too ‘socio’ for the lawyers. The 
importance of this single central national authority charged with 
defining standards of scholarly excellence is that it makes it easier 
for disciplines to resist challenge to the dominant paradigm of 
scholarship. In the United Kingdom, where each University has 
substantial autonomy in defining its own teaching and research needs 
and indeed its own local appointing practices, it is hard to impose a 
particular disciplinary model of scholarship at a national level. Yet 
that is exactly what France seeks to do.  
  
These central mechanisms for controlling the appointment and 
recruitment of tenured lecturers operate in all disciplines. But in law 
there is a particular and additional central mechanism controlling 
promotion to Chair in the form of a highly competitive exam called 
the agrégation du supérieur. There are other tracks by which 
lecturers can be appointed Law professors on the basis of experience 
and published work (though they all involve the relevant national 
committee of the CNU having to judge them qualified on the basis of 
their submissions). But the vast majority of the available posts for 
Chair (and the number is determined nationally) are filled by the 
concours d’agrégation (in other words by a classic French competitive 
exam in which candidates are ranked and the top candidates 
appointed up to the prescribed number of available posts).  This 
examination has been at the heart of the intellectual reproduction of 
Law Faculties since its introduction nationally by Napoleon III in the 
19th century.53 The regulations which constituted and organised this 
corps of Professeurs agrégés explicitly declared the objective of 
establishing order and hierarchy amongst teaching staff.54 Successive 
reforms have varied the particular form of the exercises set for the 
candidates55 but the underlying spirit has remained largely 
unchanged: candidates are asked over a limited time-period to 
prepare and present structured oral lessons to the examiners on a 
subject assigned to them. The competitions for private law, public 
law and history of law are all organized similarly. Candidates must 
have a doctorate and the jury consists of 6 Professors and one high-
ranking judge all of whom are chosen by the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Research. If you apply in private law, your allocated 
topics may be chosen from anywhere within the broad domain of 
private law (which paradoxically to the British eye, would include 
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criminal law and justice). The first test consists of a discussion of 30 
to 45 minutes about the published research of the candidate. If the 
candidate is allowed to progress to the next stage, it consists of the 
preparation and presentation of a lesson about a prescribed text. The 
candidates that survive then go on to two further tests: in the first, 
the famous épreuve de 24 heures, the candidate is randomly given a 
general topic which he or she has 24 hours to research with the help 
of a team recruited from academic friends and contacts. The 
candidate must then present an exposition of the topic in 45 minutes 
before the jury. After this there is a similar but shorter presentation 
on a more technical text that the candidate has 8 hours to prepare 
alone (no team of supporting researchers for this one). These lessons 
have been described as ‘a lesson in formalism pushed to the 
extreme.’56 We have already mentioned the distinctive binary plan 
required in almost all forms of legal scholarship. The presentations 
for these tests must be constructed in two parts (with headings 
numbered I et II) and four sub-parts (which are identified I.A., I.B., 
II.A. et II.B.). The presentations must be carefully timed: for the 
eight hour test it must last exactly 30 minutes and there is an ideal 
duration for each of the parts. For presentation for the 24 hour test, 
after 45 minutes – when he or she will be interrupted by the President 
of the Jury – the candidate should have just completed the 
presentation of the first sub-part of the second part. The jury look at 
both the technical quality of the content and the intellectual 
coherence of the structured plan to evaluate the expository talent of 
the candidates who are then ranked in an order of merit that is 
published.57  
 
There are many articles which testify to the mythic quality of the 
concours d’agrégation and its key role in the socialisation of 
Professors of Law.58 Many candidates will prepare together for the 
tests and the experience often forms very strong academic bonds 
that may be foundational for subsequent careers. And the 
examination sustains a symbolic hierarchy within Law Faculties that 
has no obvious equivalent elsewhere. One can become a Professeur 
agrégé in one’s early thirties with a volume of publications that would 
not guarantee even a senior lectureship in the United Kingdom. There 
are no direct consequences in terms of formal power and the financial 
rewards are limited. Yet to be, or not to be, a Professeur agrégé has 
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consequences for academic status that will last an entire career. 
Those who are maîtres de conférences (tenured lecturers) or who 
have become Professors by building up over time a record of 
published work and administrative or teaching experience will always 
lack what remains the ultimate intellectual accolade in the legal 
academy.  
 
What are the consequences of this particular form of academic 
recruitment for the nature of legal scholarship in France? By 
comparison with the United Kingdom, where appointment to a Chair 
is a matter for autonomous universities, the concours d’agrégation 
effectively defines at a national level what constitutes an outstanding 
legal scholar. Indeed it is a handful of Professors, all of them 
themselves Professeurs agrégés, all of them appointed by the 
Ministry, that effectively make the decisions on the appointment of 
the most prestigious and numerically largest category of Chairs. The 
danger is that this may perpetuate relatively closely defined norms 
for legal scholarship and privilege the traditionally established model 
of doctrinal analysis. Even the initial examination of published work 
presents the danger that certain kinds of topics and analysis may be 
preferred to others and lead to the exclusion of candidates doing 
more unconventional work. It is often said that within the private law 
competition the profile of publications of those who progress shows 
more evidence of classical doctrinal analysis of the law of obligations 
than it does the empirical analysis of criminal justice, interdisciplinary 
studies, comparative law or work in a foreign language. And beyond 
that, the three tests of presentation skills all place the emphasis on 
the capacity to set out positive legal rules in an ordered, systematic 
and coherent fashion. Although such a talent for close doctrinal 
analysis does not preclude an interest in interdisciplinary or critical 
approaches, it tends to make them less than essential. Each year, 
the system promotes to the highest rank scholars who are 
remarkably young (averaging around 33 years old) but to be 
promoted they have to prepare assiduously for a highly formalized 
examination, set and enforced by an older generation of Professeurs 
agrégés. The successful candidates tend disproportionately to have 
done their doctorates in one of the Parisian Faculties and to pursue 
research that tends to follow classical lines.59 Criticism of the system 
is sometimes heard60 and the model shows some signs of fissure,61 
but the dominant discourse is one that defends le concours 
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d’agrégation as a way of constituting a national elite of legal scholars 
and guaranteeing its quality.62 But having been required to make 
huge personal intellectual investment in their early years in the 
cultivation of skills of highly structured doctrinal exposition and 
having been rewarded by early promotion to the highest ranks of 
legal academia, perhaps it is not surprising if this shapes the 
intellectual pattern of subsequent careers.63 In turn, this constitutes 
a highly powerful elite that will then select the next generation.  
 
II. CHARTING PRESENCE (a state of the art) 
In Part I we argued that socio-legal studies does not have the same 
contested yet visible presence within the discipline that it does in 
the Anglo-American academy. We offered an explanation for this 
relatively limited presence of the socio-legal in France in certain 
aspects of the intellectual history of law as a discipline in France 
and the institutional history of Law Faculties themselves. In this 
second Part, we want to chart the presence of the socio-legal, the 
way in which, despite these constraints, socio-legal research has 
managed to construct certain spaces within the academy. If one 
were to seek to identify a primary moment of presence for socio-
legal research within the Law Faculties, one would have to go back 
to the 1970s (A) whereas the new trends towards critical and 
sociological analysis of law are developing outside and beyond the 
Law Faculties (B). 
 
A. Inside the Law Faculty 
There have been many attempts within the Law Faculties to draw in 
insights from other disciplines but generally the tendency has been 
to be to look for ways in which those other disciplines can serve the 
legal, in other words to provide practical or symbolic support to the 
legal order (1). But since the 1970s, one can identify certain 
currents within the Law Faculties where more critical interventions 
have developed to challenge the dominant doctrinal discourses (2).  
  1. Interdisciplinary encounters with the mainstream   
The first real interdisciplinary encounter within French Law Faculties 
in which legal scholarship began to step beyond the doctrinal 
exposition of rules was in the 19th century with the history of law 
and especially roman law.64 In 1855, the Revue historique de droit 
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français et étranger65 was founded and set ambitious goals for an 
historical understanding of law which would situate legal 
phenomena in time and space. By the 1880s and 90s, the teaching 
of legal history was becoming general in the Law Faculties. But 
paradoxically, as legal history began to gain clearer professional 
recognition and autonomy, it narrowed its conceptual ambitions.66 
This is evident in the contents of the Revue historique de droit 
français et étranger: studies of foreign legal principles become 
increasingly rare and the focus sharpens on exposition of 
specialised legal techniques from the past and their historical 
evolution.67 Thus rather than a interdisciplinary challenge which 
would open up questions of social and political context, legal history 
became an internal reading of law: lawyers turning to the ancient 
sources rather than historians turning their broader gaze on the 
law. Furthermore, French legal history from the first half of the 20th 
century began to demonstrate a certain legal nationalism. 
Textbooks tended to tell a story in which the French state, 
characterised in terms of key distinctive specificities, emerged 
through a series of stages (the Frankish period, feudal monarchy, 
absolute monarchy, the Revolution and its consequences).68 The 
tone was often nostalgic and sometimes reactionary.69 The 
accompanying disconnect with social history produced a story that 
emphasized, sometimes implausibly, the continuity of legal 
traditions. Thus rather than a broad-ranging external challenge to 
doctrinal orthodoxies, much of the legal history written and studied 
in Law Faculties comforted established ways of doing things.  
Although this was not generally a critical legal history that 
constructed bridges to the other social sciences, certain of its key 
leading figures during the 20th century (Henri Lévy-Bruhl, Gabriel 
Le Bras…) did maintain links with sociologists and over time legal 
historians have begun to integrate social, political and cultural 
analysis into their research. The development of the prestigious 
Ecole des annales (The Annales School) with its re-thinking of the 
French historiographical tradition within the Humanities Faculties 
was important in this. So there is now a stronger interpenetration of 
general perspectives from the humanities and social sciences in the 
study of legal history in France (particularly in new areas of 
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research such as the history of labour law).70 But there has been no 
equivalent to the impact of general social historians like E.P. 
Thompson in their challenge within British Law Schools to thinking 
about the relations between law and society. Legal history in French 
Law Faculties has generally not been a disturbance to the dominant 
focus of doctrinal scholarship.  
Ultimately the same can be said of the relations of sociology to law 
within the Law Faculties. In France, a specialised legal branch of 
general sociology was introduced into teaching and research by 
certain lawyers and legal historians in the second half of the 20th 
century.71 The key driver was Jean Carbonnier (1908-2003),72 
widely known both for his famous text book on civil law (Manuel de 
droit civil) and as the founding figure of legal sociology. Developed 
in his Laboratoire de sociologie du droit at the University of Paris II 
and through several influential works,73 his legal sociology called for 
a move away from the exclusive study of legal texts to the 
observation and explanation of legal practices as social phenomena: 
he sought to introduce sociological methods and the empirical study 
of legal actors and practices. 74 But this was not an attempt to 
construct a pure science: his aims were instrumental, indeed 
utilitarian. Conceived as a sub-discipline of law rather than of 
general sociology, his legal sociology was aimed at lawyers.75 While 
it had scientific functions, its primary raison d’être was practical: it 
was an applied science existing to support and guide those actually 
involved in the making of law.76 Legislation was the primary product 
in this process.77 The legal sociologist existed to inform the 
legislator as to the application of the law (or the absence of it) and 
about the practices and aspirations of those using the law. But, 
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while legal sociology could inform and guide the legislator, it could 
not substitute for the political act that was legislation.  
Carbonnier did not just set the terms of this specialised and applied 
sociology of legislation, he demonstrated its potential application by 
providing practical assistance to the Ministry of Justice. Thus he was 
commissioned to conduct major sociological investigations into key 
issues and drew up many draft Bills of important reforms in Family 
Law. His practical impact and his status as a great scholar of civil 
law gave credibility to his legal sociology in the Law Faculties. But 
nevertheless there is not really an active current school of thought 
built around his legacy: his ‘Centre for Legal Sociology’ still exists 
but research done there now is essentially doctrinal analysis. The 
idea of a sociology of legislation has not really been picked up and 
carried on by the modern generation of Law Professors. But 
Carbonnier remains a figure of enormous prestige and his 
achievement in making known and respectable a sociological 
approach in the Law Faculties is a considerable one. In part, his 
influence may reflect the fact that his thinking was not ideologically 
suspect.78 While Carbonnier envisaged that legal sociology might 
lead to overt critique of legal dogma, that was not its principal 
function.79 On the contrary he saw the new sub-discipline as ancilla 
jurisprudentia, as a support to the legal order80 and he explicitly 
warned against the excessive glorification of critique.81 Those who 
have adopted the critical voice in Law Faculties have often been 
marginalized.  
 2. Against orthodoxy: critical legal studies ‘à la 
française’? 
The image of French Law Faculties that we have drawn so far has 
emphasized its conservatism: an established orthodoxy built around 
a doctrinal vision of legal scholarship is reinforced by patterns of 
socialisation and recruitment. But at various points alternative 
theoretical approaches have emerged to challenge the dominant 
culture. In some cases, the challenge to academic orthodoxy has 
been overtly political in claiming allegiance to socialist ideas. Ever 
since the end of the 19th century, there have been lawyers who 
have sought to develop a socialist perspective on law in France. 82 
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But these movements outside the Law Faculty had little influence 
within it. Only from the 1970s can one begin to identify a group of 
legal scholars from within the academy beginning to develop a 
socialist critique of law.  
The social and political context of May and June 1968 was critical to 
this. A series of social movements, strikes and demonstrations 
coalesced together to become a major cultural, social and political 
challenge to traditional authority. For certain key political and 
professional actors – including a legal profession and judiciary in the 
processes of unionization - law and justice became part of the 
terrain of political struggle.83 In the midst of this tumult of radical 
ideas, new practices and disciplinary alliances emerged. Historians 
and economists began to pay a new and particular interest to the 
law while at the same time certain legal scholars within the 
academy began to be converted to Marxist ideologies. At first these 
were isolated individuals but over time they began to organise 
collectively.  
 ‘Critique du droit’84 was a group formed in 1978 from Law 
Professors and Lecturers mainly from strongly unionized Faculties in 
the provinces that were  openly committed to the political left. 
Publishing a manifesto, launching a journal and a book series,85 the 
group had both scientific and pedagogical aims, seeking both to 
develop an alternative understanding of law and to transform 
teaching practices in order to promote the transition to socialism.86 
The project was overtly rooted in a Marxist historically materialist 
approach in which both state and law were seen as a product of 
class struggle. Claims of the neutrality of law were manifestations of 
bourgeois idealism and formalism which served merely to reinforce 
the dominance of the capitalist mode of production.87 Yet the impact 
of the group on the academic mainstream was much more limited 
than that of the various radical and critical strands that developed 
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within the Anglo-American legal academy in the 1970s.88 After 12 
years, the group stopped meeting and publishing and no longer 
exists as such. But its traces remain in certain pockets of critical 
practice to be found in the Law Faculties where orthodox doctrinal 
assumptions about legal practice are unpicked and challenged. The 
nature of the critical approaches adopted varies greatly in different 
places.  
The Centre for Critical Legal Research (Centre de recherches 
critiques sur le droit - CERCRID) at the Jean Monnet University in 
Saint-Etienne explicitly claims a direct line of descent from ‘Critique 
du droit’.89 It remains a rare example of a university research 
centre essentially made up of lawyers which seeks to promote an 
approach that goes beyond the doctrinal. Unlike the sociologist who 
addresses legal rules and practices from an external perspective 
without considering the internal logic underpinning them, research 
at CERCRID aims to take law seriously. But this is done not simply 
in order to ask questions about the normative coherence of legal 
doctrine as a body of rules, but rather to see legal rules as 
measurable social phenomena and therefore legitimate objects of 
sociological analysis.90 Thus a lot of empirical studies of courts and 
judicial activity have been conducted (often based on statistical 
analysis). 
A very different kind of critical approach can be observed at the 
Centre de Théorie du Droit which was created in 1978 by Michel 
Troper. He argued the need for an epistemological break with 
dominant legal discourses and the construction of a new legal 
science. 91 Drawing together strands as diverse as Kelsen, legal 
realism and the linguistic turn, Michel Troper’s theory of law has 
little in common politically with the socialist critique of law aside 
from a shared desire to reveal the ideological assumptions of 
doctrinal analysis.92 Although it cannot be said to have created a 
distinct school of thought, the Centre provides a training in legal 
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theory and has trained a certain number of researchers who carry 
on its critical project.  
There are other important examples of individual legal scholars and 
research groupings who are trying to go beyond orthodox doctrinal 
analysis. Sometimes individual,93 sometimes more collective,94 this 
work often receives recognition for its quality and innovation from 
fellow scholars. But because they run against the grain of 
established patterns of recruitment, promotion and thus 
socialisation within the Law Faculties, these initiatives struggle to 
leave an enduring institutional effect on the way law is researched 
and taught. In the end, most of the socio-legal work done in France 
is now being done outside the Law Faculties.  
B. Beyond the Law Faculty 
We have argued that the institutional structure of French universities 
has not helped the development of socio-legal studies. The national 
state framework for defining a discipline marginalizes areas of 
research like socio-legal studies which have no official section within 
the CNU. The consequence is that socio-legal research takes place as 
a series of separate appendages to recognized disciplines like 
economics, political science or sociology for which law is not a central 
concern (1). But the effect of this loss of institutionalized academic 
legitimacy has been mitigated both by the fact that some of the most 
influential figures in French social science have given a major role to 
law within their broader social theories and that, in part in 
consequence, we are witnessing a flourishing of empirical studies of 
law and legal practices outside the Law Faculties (2).  
 
1.  Constructing socio-legal sub-disciplines  
The structure of disciplines within the social sciences in French 
universities was transformed during the 20th century. After the 
emergence of sociology at the start of the century came the 
development of political science and economics after the 2nd World 
War. Paradoxically, these last two disciplines actually first developed 
within the Law Faculties before shifting their focus away from legal 
contexts as they developed their own institutional autonomy. This 
shift to other research areas reflected not only the difficulty of making 
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société. 
connections with a highly doctrinal legal science but also the 
perceived need for the new disciplines to establish a distinct identity.  
 
The economic analysis of law provides a remarkable illustration of the 
tensions. For legal scholars, economic relations are inevitably 
constituted by the law and so economics is clearly a related area of 
knowledge. But French lawyers have been quite reluctant to embrace 
concepts drawn from economics or to develop economic analysis of 
legal practices. Thus the field known as economic law actually 
contains little economic analysis of law.95 Such an instrumental view 
of law generally seems within the Law Faculties to be in tension with 
the conceptual categorizing at the heart of the civil law tradition.96 
Thus the paradox is that the teaching of political economy has taken 
place within Law Faculties for 150 years but the economic analysis of 
law largely takes place within the Economics Faculties which 
developed their own institutional autonomy in the 1960s.97 
Noticeably the economists working on economic analysis of law have 
tended to avoid the analysis of French law, perhaps an indication of 
the difficulty of cooperating with the Law Faculties.98 
 
Political sciences provide another example of the rather distant 
relationship between law and other disciplines. After some initial 
developments at the end of the 19th century,99 French political 
sciences then re-emerged within the Law Faculties as a discipline 
allied to Public Law. One might have anticipated that the obvious links 
between politics and law might have led political scientists very 
quickly to develop socio-legal studies, but until recently this has not 
been the case. After the 2nd World War, political scientists 
emphasized the search for disciplinary autonomy by creating their 
own research networks, degree programmes and distinct teaching 
institutions. The introduction of a separate version of the competitive 
exam to become Professor (concours d’ agrégation) for political 
science in 1971 was a final recognition of this new independence.100 
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It remains true that political science continues to be taught within 
Law Faculties but this is now an institutionally separate discipline with 
its own section of the CNU.  
 
This disciplinary separation has been accompanied by intellectual 
autonomy in the definition of research questions and methods. It is 
not just that the particular agenda for investigation is now very 
different from that of Public Law (with particular emphasis on studies 
of political behavior and affiliation, elections and political parties). 
The new discipline uses inductive methods to study scientifically the 
reality of the exercise of power in a way that is very different from 
the traditional deductive search for normative coherence that has 
been the mark of the civil lawyer. 101 For some this represents not 
just a break with the world of the legal scholar but a negative re-
evaluation of the significance of law by political scientists.102 Thus the 
continuing delivery of political science programmes within Law 
Faculties has not until recently lead to many interventions by political 
scientists into the domain of law. But things are changing and 
although disciplinary splits persist, one can observe the emergence 
of legal questions in political science research particularly in public 
policy analysis103 and the development of European Studies.104  This 
trend amongst other disciplines to reach out to law is also evident in 
relation to sociology.  
 
The marked separation of the intellectual world of legal scholars and 
sociologists that was obvious from the start of the 20th century made 
it difficult to construct sociology of law as a sub-discipline.105 Despite 
an illustrious precursor in Durkheim, faced with a legislative sociology 
already entrenched in the Law Faculties, not many sociologists sort 
to construct a specialized branch of sociology devoted to law. The 
well-known exception was Georges Gurvitch, who developed a theory 
of social orders in his Eléments de sociologie juridique in 1940. But 
despite the range of his work, his lead was not taken up by other 
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lawyers nor sociologists106 and was even subject to sharp criticism.107 
It is only more recently that social scientists in France  have 
rediscovered the legal dimensions of the social world.  
 
A key starting point was criminal and penal justice. From the 1970s, 
the Ministry of Justice began to commission research in the sociology 
of penal institutions. Developments have been constrained by the 
dominance of a doctrinal approach to criminal law108 and the 
difficulties of constructing a criminology that is genuinely 
interdisciplinary: the national disciplinary structures of French 
universities make that just as difficult as they have made the 
construction of socio-legal studies.109 But the study of social 
(particularly legal) response to criminal activity has nevertheless 
developed in a number of research centres over the last thirty 
years.110 And in recent years a variety of theoretical approaches have 
been used to develop sociological interest in law beyond the realm of 
criminal and penal justice. These developments were mapped in the 
late 1990s for the Journal of Law and Society by André-Jean Arnaud 
and Pierre Noreau111 and the story has been brought up to date 
recently by Liora Israël.112 Certain key figures, notably Jacques 
Commaille,113 have been critical over the last 30 years to the creating 
and sustaining of institutional frameworks for the sociology of law. A 
central role has been played by the journal Droit et société,114 and to 
a lesser extent Droit et cultures, in developing a pluralist dialogue 
between sociologists, anthropologists and legal theorists. What we 
seem to be witnessing is a shift in emphasis from grand theory to 
empirical research which corresponds to what Anglo-american 
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scholars might categorize as socio-legal research (as contrasted with 
sociology of law). 
 
2. From grand theory to fieldwork  
The influence of a number of grand French theorists in Anglo-
american humanities and social science faculties has been 
considerable in recent years. But what has been their influence on 
socio-legal research in France? In terms of influence on social 
scientists working on law the impact has been variable. Deleuze, 
Baudrillard and Derrida are rarely cited whereas Foucault, Bourdieu 
and Latour have had significant influence. Over and above the 
theoretical markers they have left on the way law is conceptualized, 
what they done collectively is contribute to a renewal in the interest 
in the sociological study of law.  
Foucault occupies a particular position in that his analysis of power 
goes well beyond an analysis of the legal order. Though sometimes 
associated with a rejection or marginalization of law it is now 
recognised that his approach is far from an expulsion of law.115 In 
the study of the disciplinary technologies of modern 
governmentality, law is recognised, alongside other non-legal 
techniques, as both on the one hand, shaping the conduct of 
populations and on the other, as a resource for action by individual 
subjects. Although he had no intention of establishing schools of 
theory or training disciples, Foucault’s theoretical perspectives on 
law have had a marked influence on the development of French 
socio-legal research. This is because Foucaultian theoretical tools 
have been picked up creatively by different researchers and used to 
re-think major areas of law (for example, François Ewald’s work on 
the welfare state116 or that of Pierre Lascoumes on criminal law.117)  
Unlike Foucault, who always came at law at something of a tangent 
through a more general reflection on power, Pierre Bourdieu set out 
directly to describe the characteristics of a legal order but to do so 
within the broader framework of his more general sociological 
concepts. Thus he developed concepts like ‘juridical labour’ by 
applying his major concepts of habitus and social field to reveal the 
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‘symbolic violence’ underpinning doctrinal legal analysis.118 By 
challenging the concept of an autonomous legal science he 
paradoxically rekindled the tensions between lawyers and 
sociologists while at the same time renewing the interest of the 
latter in the world of the former.119 Adopting his approach, several 
French researchers have conducted empirical studies of the world of 
legal practice, both on the French judiciary120 and the international 
market in private legal practice.121 
Bruno Latour completes our triumvirate of major contemporary 
French social scientists who have sought to engage with legal 
practice. Better known originally for his work on science and 
technology studies (STS) and for a series of ethnographies 
investigating Western ways of constructing truth,122 he spent many 
months immersed in the world of the Conseil d’Etat, the final court 
of appeal in France on matters of administrative law. More directly a 
contribution to the sociology of knowledge than of law, nevertheless 
the richness of the work has important implications for socio-legal 
research. Beyond the particular theoretical interest of the 
argument, the status of its author and the distinctive empirical 
nature of its investigation are likely to reinforce other tendencies 
already enhancing sociological interest in law. Here, one can pick 
out what has been termed the ‘juridicisation’ of the political123 as 
well as rapid shifts in the nature of legal regulation.124 But it is the 
form of that interest that is particularly striking: empirical studies 
and ethnographic research seem suddenly to have overtaken the 
traditional French sociological orientation towards abstract theory. 
This may be part of a general evolution (or even erosion) of the 
                                                             
118 P. Bourdieu, ‘La force du droit. Eléments pour une sociologie du champ 
juridique’, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (1986) 64, 3 [translated by 
R. Terdiman, ‘The Force of Law : Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, 
Hasting Law Journal (1987) 38, 814]. 
119 See for example the introduction by Jacques Commaille of a special issue of 
Droit et société  (2004) 56-57 devoted to the place of law in the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu. Also see ‘Norme, règle, habitus et droit chez Bourdieu’ (1996) 32 Droit 
et société  
120 See for example A Bancaud, ‘Une constance mobile. La haute magistrature’, 
Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (1989) 76, 30, or Une exception 
ordinaire : La Magistrature en France 1930-1950 (2002). 
121 See particularly the work of Yves Dezalay: 
http://www.cessp.cnrs.fr/spip.php?rubrique88 
122 B. Latour, La fabrique du droit. Une ethnographie du Conseil d’Etat (2002) 
[Transl. M. Brilman et al. The making of law: an ethnography of the Conseil d'Etat 
(2009)]. 
123 J. Commaille and others (eds), La juridicisation du politique. Leçons 
scientifiques (2000). 
124 L. Israël, op. cit., esp. 269-272. 
traditional role and status of the French intellectual.125 But this 
modern shift in the world of the academy has had the positive effect 
of generating new lines of development in French socio-legal 
research. Whether this will in the end affect even the classical figure 
of the Law Professor remains to be seen.126  
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